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Article 1 
Pragmatic engagement in a low trust supply chain: Beef farmers’ perceptions of 2 
power, trust and agency 3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
The academic discussion of power in supply chains has changed from a discussion of 6 
the use of coercive power to one which emphasises the role of trust in embedding co-7 
operation and disincentivising opportunism. Whilst a number of empirical studies have 8 
suggested the former is alive and well, this paper argues that power relations may also 9 
be constituted by the self-perceptions of weaker actors as much as by the explicit 10 
actions of more powerful ones. This study explores the role of power through the 11 
perceptions of subjugated actors, which set the ‘rules of the game’. Our case centres on 12 
perceptions of Northern Irish beef farmers and their reflections on their ‘powerlessness’ 13 
in relation to the larger, more consolidated processors that they sell to. We find that the 14 
way farmers make sense of the power relations they encounter is influenced by the 15 
individuating character of the power relations exercised by the processors, which 16 
debilitates their ability to collaborate and resist collectively. What emerges is a story 17 
about the process of accommodation whereby farmers pragmatically resign themselves 18 
to play by ‘the rules of the game’ to remain ‘part of the game’.  19 
 20 
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Introduction 26 
Various theories of effective supply chain organisation and management argue that 27 
leveraging or creating value in modern economies requires greater supply chain 28 
coordination to improve efficiency and long term competitive advantage (Womack et 29 
al., 1990; Simons et al., 2003; Duarte Canever et al., 2008). It is argued that improved 30 
co-operation and co-ordination in supply chains, however, requires trust (Dwyer et al., 31 
1987; Moorman et al., 1993; Morgan & Hunt, 1994); but that the development of trust 32 
can be hindered by the exercise of certain forms of supply chain power (Blau 1964; 33 
Hingley 2005). The effects of power are often downplayed because its expression is 34 
sometimes difficult to identify as it is experienced subjectively (Fleming and Spicer 35 
2014). Similarly supply chain actors, particularly those who exercise power to their 36 
advantage may do so defensively which complicates understanding of motives by those 37 
affected (Bowman et al 2013). The lack of overt and unambiguous understandings of 38 
how power is expressed and what its effects are within a supply chain, gives rise to an 39 
interesting yet sensitive area of research; and one which lends itself to a constructivist 40 
approach. 41 
Employing thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with farmers, this paper 42 
explores their perceptions of power, trust and agency in the sector. This paper therefore 43 
adds to the growing corpus of literature on supply chain power (Hingley 2005; 44 
Lindgreen et al., 2005; Storey et al., 2006; Duarte Canever et al., 2008; Bowman et al 45 
2013; Fleming and Spicer 2014; Hingley et al., 2015) by exploring the process of 46 
accommodation amongst weaker parties in one sub-sector of an industry characterised 47 
by low trust and strong power relations. This theoretical contribution is discussed in 48 
relation to our empirical case - Northern Irish beef farmers - who are good case to 49 
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explore such themes given their relatively fragmented character and the concentrated 50 
nature of the Northern Irish processor segment. 51 
A first section reviews the extant academic literature on the effects of power on trust 52 
in supply chain. A second explains the sectoral context within which power is 53 
expressed. Methods and discussion of findings follows in later sections. The paper then 54 
ends with a reflection on the impact of power on trust and agency in this sector. 55 
 56 
Power and Trust in Supply Chains: Theoretical Considerations 57 
The effects of supply chain power on inter-organisational trust is an important area of 58 
research within studies of business organisations and supply chain management. But 59 
over the last 40+ years this discussion has moved from the use of power to coerce to the 60 
role of power in embedding legitimacy and co-operation in supply chains to the 61 
importance of trust and the way it mitigates the expedient and opportunist use of 62 
coercive power. It is worthwhile revisiting this literature briefly.  63 
The study of power has come some way since Dahl’s (1957) original statement that 64 
‘A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not 65 
otherwise do.’ Applying this definition to a supply chain context was always fraught 66 
with difficulties when, for example, it was never clear what B would ‘otherwise do’ in 67 
the absence of A’s power, when B was locked into a relationship with A because B was 68 
reliant on A to purchase his/her goods or services, and the relation between A and B 69 
might be zero sum (B’s margin was A’s cost).  70 
One response was to refine Dahl’s definition and make it more relevant for a supply 71 
chain application. Hence Wilemon (1972) argued that: ‘power refers to the ability of 72 
one channel [supply chain] member to induce another channel [supply chain] member 73 
to change its behaviour in favour of the objectives of the channel member exerting 74 
Competition & Change 0 (0) 
influence.’ This made Dahl’s subtle distinction more apparent: power is not just 75 
something one partner ‘has,’ but is also something that one partner ‘exercises’; power is 76 
a relation as much as a possession. This distinction led to what Gatski (1984) referred to 77 
as the growth of ‘channel power and conflict theory’ – the study of the impact of one 78 
supply chain member’s power (its character, source and extent) on the amount of 79 
conflict with their chain partners. 80 
For some authors the results were predictable and conclusive. Robicheaux and El-81 
Ansary (1977) for example argued that when one partner possessed significantly higher 82 
levels of power, this led to an increase in the coercive use of that power. This was 83 
reinforced by many laboratory studies which demonstrated a positive correlation 84 
between power and coercion (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Roering 1977). But others were 85 
more sceptical of this reading. Lindgreen et al. (2005) argued that the existence of 86 
power relations did not imply the abuse of those relations, whilst Frazier and Summers 87 
(1986) argued these lab experiments could not replicate reality and misunderstood the 88 
complex trade-offs necessary for maintaining long term supplier relationships.  89 
Those longer term trade-offs might, for example, include that between the gains from 90 
coercion and the loss of trust; powerful actors gained legitimacy by resisting their 91 
ability to use power coercively (Blau, 1964). In this way, it was argued, co-operative 92 
supply chain relations could co-exist with significant power differentials, provided 93 
larger firms did not abuse their position and weaker supply chain members understood 94 
and accepted this power imbalance (Hingley, 2005; Hingley et al., 2015).  95 
For others, it was not just that restraint was important, but that legitimate power 96 
could be used constructively to facilitate supply chain co-ordination (Stern 1969; 97 
Provan and Gassenheimer 1994). Power could be exercised to positively reward instead 98 
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of negatively coerce, maintaining greater co-operation and efficiency (Maloni and 99 
Benton, 2000; Benton and Maloni, 2005). 100 
These ideas (arguably) became dominant within supply chain management texts. In 101 
the 1990s this led to a subtle shift in emphasis away from how restraint might embed 102 
legitimacy, towards a discussion of trust as a means of mitigating opportunism and 103 
coercion. Trust would supposedly embed co-operation (Moorman et al., 1993), 104 
encourage commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), help overcome mutual difficulties 105 
(Dwyer et al., 1987), and stimulate risk-taking and risk-spreading (La Londe, 2002), 106 
thus avoiding the need for forcible, directive demands as a method for supply chain co-107 
ordination (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Storey et al., 2006). The intellectual shift, in other 108 
words, moved from the relations between ‘power and coercion’ to those of ‘trust and the 109 
curtailment of coercive power’.  110 
This shift set many authors on a search for the organisational supports towards trust-111 
building in supply chains (Monczka and Morgan, 1997; Akkermans et al., 1999). This 112 
included commitments to open communication and data sharing (La Londe and Masters, 113 
1994), the development of shared technologies which bridge company boundaries 114 
(Kaufman et al., 2000; Schönsleben, 2000; Vokurka, 2000), dedicated investment which 115 
embedded co-operation (Nyaga et al., 2010) and the broader growth of a more holistic 116 
management philosophy (Harland et al., 1999).  117 
It followed then that trust might actually reduce costs, improve efficiency and nurture 118 
a more sustainable competitive advantage for the whole chain (Harland, 1996; Chen and 119 
Pulraj, 2004; Storey et al., 2006; Hartmann and De Grahl, 2011; Azadegan, 2011; 120 
Paulraj, 2011). According to these authors, trust negated the need for expensive 121 
surveillance and other transaction costs throughout the supply chain (Ballou et al., 2000; 122 
Kwon and Suh, 2004). It improved quality (Hammer, 2001), enhanced planning and 123 
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forecasting (Kwon and Suh, 2004) and sped up responsiveness from suppliers 124 
(Handfield and Bechtel, 2002). The supply chain management orthodoxy asserted that 125 
trust relations disincentivised the use and abuse of coercive power and enhanced 126 
collaboration to promote efficiency for the whole supply chain (see Morgan and Hunt, 127 
1994; Batt, 2003; Lindegreen et al., 2005; Hingley, 2005; Lindegreen et al., 2005; 128 
Doukidis et al., 2007; Fischer et al., 2007, 2008, 2010; Kähkönen and Tenkanen, 2010; 129 
Terpend and Ashenboum, 2012; Bryne and Power, 2014; Kähkönen, 2014).  130 
This optimistic story has been, however, difficult to substantiate empirically. A 131 
number of case studies found it difficult to find true examples of this kind of holistic co-132 
ordination, and found a continuing and recurrent use of coercive power (Bowman et al., 133 
2013; Storey et al 2006). Similarly it is questionable whether shared technologies like 134 
open book accounting have embedded trust or encouraged predation when they make 135 
visible a supplier’s margin which can be cannibalised. We would suggest that the 136 
balance of emphasis has swung too far in favour of ‘the importance of trust’ and ignored 137 
the continuing importance of coercive power. Though these themes remain prevalent in 138 
the global value chain literature on the governance of buyer-supplier relations (Gereffi 139 
et al. 2005, Gereffi and Lee, 2016), in particular the role of conventions which 140 
underwrite the exercise of power (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). But here we would make 141 
two observations.  142 
First, the emphasis on trust has created an almost binary divide between the 143 
principles of co-operation and power, and in so doing presents a very narrow conception 144 
of what power is and how it is exercised. Power continues to be exercised coercively in 145 
many sectors, but we would note that power can be exercised through more subtle 146 
means. Power may be more diffuse, oblique and systemic in character. Fleming & 147 
Spicer (2014) for example argue that in organisations ‘…power is not only exercised 148 
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through highly visible acts of direction or even back room politicking. It also infuses 149 
many of the systems, processes, ideas and even identities that organisations constitute.’ 150 
(p. 275). If we extend this idea to whole supply chains, we might observe that the 151 
potential to exercise coercive power – or even perceptions about its potential exercise – 152 
may deter certain forms of activity, whether coercion is explicitly used or not (Emerson, 153 
1962, p. 32). This ‘perceptual’ source of power, particularly the perceptions of the 154 
subjugated actor, can set the ‘rules of the game’ and can have the equivalent effect to 155 
those of coercive instruction (eg Bacharach and Lawler, 1976). It is also possible that 156 
this perceptual source of power becomes entwined with what Lukes (1986) refers to as 157 
non-decision making power and Tedeschi and Bonoma (1972) call ‘ecological control’ 158 
– the perceived absence of alternatives on the part of weaker actors, whose 159 
understandings may be shaped by and in turn shape their positional dependence and 160 
sense of powerlessness.  161 
This leads to a second point, that if power is multi-dimensional then power relations 162 
may be structured as much by the self-perceptions of weaker actors as much as by the 163 
explicit actions of more powerful actors. In a Foucauldian sense, power is therefore not 164 
‘possessed’ but rather embodied and enacted (Foucault 1982). Of course the two may 165 
not be separate as we outline above, but it is still important to think about how 166 
perceptions of the powerless characterise power dynamics ‘from the ground up’ (see for 167 
example Beier and Ster, 1969).  A weaker actor’s perception of the need to respect and 168 
comply with a powerful party (French and Raven, 1959) may encourage pragmatic, but 169 
resigned engagement. Our focus for the purposes of this paper is hence less on the 170 
active force of more powerful agents, but the process of accommodation among weaker 171 
ones. This requires us to be sensitive to power as a relation, embodied in discourse and 172 
practice. 173 
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This different emphasis allows us to approach the relation between power, trust and 174 
agency. We therefore selected a sector characterised by relational power imbalances to 175 
examine the pragmatic, but resigned engagement at one particularly vulnerable node. 176 
Our sector of choice was the beef sector and our interviewees of choice were Northern 177 
Irish farmers. This sector was chosen because of the extensive literature that highlights 178 
the presence of adversarial market relations and the absence of co-operation and 179 
collaboration within the agricultural sector in general.  180 
 181 
Research Context  182 
The domination of the UK agri-food chains by powerful multiple food retailers was 183 
documented as far back as the 1980’s in several Monopolies and Mergers Commission 184 
(MMC) and Office of Fair Trading (OFT) reports (Burt and Sparks, 2003). Retailer 185 
strength grew after the BSE crisis in 1996 as the various import bans across Europe 186 
meant UK multiples became the only major outlet for UK beef farmers and processors. 187 
This encouraged more hostile power relations, with much of the burden of adjustment 188 
passed further down the chain to actors (farmers) (O’Keeffe, 1998; Buccirossi et al., 189 
2002; Consumers International, 2012).   190 
Since then these power imbalances have become expressed through technologies 191 
which ostensibly could be used to embed trust but are instead used to discipline 192 
suppliers. For example, supply arrangements which have no defined contractual length 193 
could be used to negotiate flexibility for all actors but in reality allow retailers to walk 194 
away if they find better deals elsewhere or if they deem supplier practices to be non-195 
compliant (Burt and Sparks, 2003; Bowman et al., 2012; Bowman et al., 2013). 196 
Similarly open book accounting practices could encourage information sharing 197 
positively, but are used by retailers to cannibalise any margin gains by their suppliers 198 
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(Free, 2008; Bowman et al., 2013). These and other techniques like reverse auctions to 199 
lower tender prices enable the retailer to dictate the terms of the business relationship 200 
with their suppliers and pass the risks and costs onto them (Bowman et al., 2012; 201 
Bowman et al., 2013). Consequently, suppliers are then incentivised to pass the cost of 202 
adjustment onto processors, who in turn try to pass risk on to their suppliers and so on 203 
until those pressures reach farmers (Taylor, 2006; Bowman et al., 2012; Bowman et al., 204 
2013). This kind of contractual predation has a fragmentary effect, encouraging sectoral 205 
opportunism and a culture of dealing as actors try to exploit minor and often fleeting 206 
sources of advantage. Trust formation within the sector becomes difficult to establish 207 
with suspicion the norm.  208 
The impact of the supermarket price wars with the emergence of hard discounters 209 
like Aldi and Lidl has further amplified these trends. Figure 1 shows the respective 210 
market shares of UK based retailers from November 2014 to November 2015 where 211 
Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury’s market share has deceased over this period, while hard 212 
discounters such as Aldi and Lidl have increased their market share by 0.8% and 0.6% 213 
respectively. But the effects are trans-sectoral when all are forced to compete on the 214 
price of staples. 215 
--------------------------------Insert Figure 1 approximately here-------------------------------- 216 
 217 
The impact of these pressures hit beef farmers in particular because they are unable 218 
to pass on financial adjustment due to their position (the first node) in the supply chain 219 
and their relatively fragmented organisational character. Farmers therefore tend to 220 
experience significant financial insecurity and information asymmetry, which nurtures 221 
myopia and insularity. The few studies available suggest suspicion that arises at this 222 
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level of the chain may not only be reserved for supermarkets, but may express itself as 223 
suspicion of processors and even other farmers (Nitschke and O’Keefe, 1997).  224 
There has been little work on trust and power in the Northern Irish beef industry 225 
specifically. Perhaps the closest is that of Fischer et al. (2007) who found a mistrust of 226 
processors at farm level in the Irish and UK beef chains due to issues of price, 227 
transparency and the power imbalance within the chain. Similar findings were found in 228 
the fruit and vegetable market where academic work has highlighted how these general 229 
sectoral pressures have led to a series of disconnections and power asymmetries which 230 
undermine trust (Batt, 2003; Doukidis et al., 2007). Outside the UK, there are similar 231 
findings, where farmers’ demonstrable mistrust of slaughterhouses is attributable to 232 
power imbalances in the Dutch pork market (Lindgreen et al., 2005).  233 
But it is important to be sensitive to the regional specificities of these markets. 234 
Many studies tend to conflate the quite different markets of Northern Ireland and the 235 
British mainland. For example, farming in NI is much more fragmented, with smaller 236 
economies of scale compared to other regions such as England. Northern Irish beef 237 
farms tend to be small for historical reasons. Land was typically divided among 238 
generations of farming families, so that each farmer would own a finite amount of land 239 
and that land would typically specialise in a particular stage of beef production, e.g. hill 240 
land is not suitable for cattle close to being ‘finished’ for slaughter. Additionally, there 241 
are more independent processors in England, compared to NI where competition is 242 
limited as processing is controlled in the hands of a few companies. Reduced 243 
competition in processing and the large number of small beef farms in NI, provides 244 
processors with numerous supply options but farmers with limited selling options, 245 
illustrating a unique competitive environment. This may make perceptions of 246 
powerlessness and dependency more acute in the Northern Irish case, exacerbating 247 
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mistrust and hampering efficient co-operation, making it an area worthy of 248 
investigation.   249 
A qualitative interview technique was necessary to understand farmers’ perceptions 250 
of power, trust and agency in their supply relationship with processors.  Details of our 251 
methods used are described in the next section, after which we discuss our findings on 252 
NI farmers’ perceptions of power and their resigned engagement with processors. A 253 
final section explores the supply chain dysfunction that results in the absence of trust. 254 
 255 
Methodology 256 
Beef farmers in Northern Ireland (NI) were recruited to take part in a semi-structured 257 
interview using a purposeful sampling method. This method of sampling allows the 258 
selection of specific participants to provide rich, detailed information on the topic of 259 
interest (Patton, 2005). This meant ensuring participants from different age groups and 260 
counties throughout NI and involved in different stages of beef production (i.e. suckler 261 
calf producers and beef finishers) were recruited. Recruitment methods included emails 262 
circulated via the Ulster Farmers Union, interviewer contacts, face-to-face invitations at 263 
farmer auctions, and phone-calls to numbers obtained directly from the Department of 264 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs regional offices.  Participants were 265 
screened prior to interview to ensure they met criteria. In total, 20 male farmers were 266 
recruited and interviewed (Table 1). Written informed consent was obtained from all 267 
participants. 268 
Variables Number of 
participants 
County Antrim 4 
Armagh 4 
Down 4 
Fermanagh 2 
Londonderry 3 
Tyrone 3 
Competition & Change 0 (0) 
Age group 20-30 2 
31-40 5 
41-50 2 
51-60 6 
61-70 4 
71-80 1 
Production stage Suckling 7 
Finishing 13 
Table 1. Participant Number by County, Age and Production Stage 269 
As our emphasis was on ‘perceptions’ we took a constructivist approach to 270 
‘...understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of their 271 
experiences…’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 1 & 2). We were hence ‘…principally 272 
concerned with explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain or 273 
otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live’ (Gergen, 274 
1985, p. 266).  275 
We used semi-structured interviews to explore farmers’ self-perceptions. Using 276 
extensive literature (Fearne, 1998; Lindgreen et al., 2008; Cox et al., 2007; Fischer et 277 
al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2010), a semi-structured interview guide (with prompts) was 278 
developed to elicit these self-reported perceptions of the effects of power on trust and 279 
supply chain performance. Table 2 illustrates example interview questions. The 280 
interview guide was piloted for clarity, comprehension, reliability and timing with two 281 
beef farmers and refined. Interviews were conducted by an experienced interviewer 282 
(author) face-to-face between 16th March 2015 and 7th May 2015 and anonymity of 283 
interviewees was assured. Ethical approval was gained from the Research Ethics 284 
Committee at Queen’s University Belfast and the research was conducted in line with 285 
guidance under the Declaration of Helsinki. 286 
Example questions 
How would you describe the typical relationship 
between you as the farmer and the processor? 
How would you describe the power dynamics in 
the supply chain? 
How do they exercise that power? 
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Who holds the power in the supply chain? 
How would you describe your relationship with 
other farmers? 
How does power impact the functioning of the 
supply chain? 
How does power impact your ability to work 
with processors/ other farmers? 
How does mistrust influence the ability to work 
with processors/ other farmers? 
 287 
Table 2. Example questions asked in participant interviews 288 
Interviews were recorded, professionally transcribed in full, reviewed by the 289 
interviewer for accuracy, and coded thematically (Braun and Clark, 2006) using the 290 
qualitative data analysis programme NVivo 10 (QSR International Pty Ltd, Doncaster, 291 
Victoria, Australia). Initially, transcripts were read and re-read to achieve data 292 
‘immersion'. Subsequently, four transcripts were randomly selected and independently 293 
coded by the interviewer (Stephanie Brooks (SB)) and one outside researcher (Fiona 294 
Lavelle (FL)). Both coders discussed the preliminary codes within the data to reach a 295 
consensus on the validity and reliability of their application to the data. The remaining 296 
transcripts were coded (SB) and checked for coding consistency (FL). Both coders 297 
agreed that data saturation had occurred as no new codes emerged from the final five 298 
interviews. For further analysis, codes were grouped into potential themes and inspected 299 
for overlap to ensure that there were identifiable distinctions between themes. To 300 
increase intra-observer reliability, themes were critically discussed by three members of 301 
the research team (SB, Michelle Spence (MS) and Moira Dean (MD)) and the outside 302 
researcher (FL) who were all experienced in qualitative data analysis. As a final step, 303 
(SB, MS, MD and Adam Leaver (AL)) discussed the findings and selected key quotes to 304 
represent each theme. Although participants reviewed the results to ensure that they 305 
could not be identified, they did not provide feedback on the findings. 306 
 307 
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Findings 308 
Perceptions of Powerlessness and Control 309 
 310 
“…I think if I was being hitched to the Titanic or if I was being forced to steer the 311 
same course as the Titanic because I was in a wee boat being towed behind, I would 312 
like to be up on the bridge of the Titanic having a say. ‘Now, I think we’re going too fast 313 
now boys. I think we should be slowing down.’ But I’ll be down in the engine room of 314 
the Titanic shovelling the coal in and I’ll be the one that sinks, because the captain 315 
might get into the boat and get away… that’s the sort of analogy I feel.” (P05) 316 
 317 
In the above quote, one of our interviewee’s characterised his sense of powerlessness 318 
within the sector by outlining two perceived dimensions of power – an inability to ‘have 319 
a say’ proactively in the way the sector operates and the idea that when things do go 320 
wrong, the farmer is the most vulnerable actor because of the perceived absence of 321 
alternatives (Tedeschi and Bonoma, 1972). The imagery of the bridge versus the engine 322 
room also implies the different status, hierarchy and even class that exists between 323 
farmers and processors. The feeling of powerlessness of farmers to act when there are 324 
problems is a recurring theme in a number of interviews. 325 
This sense of powerless is seen to arise from the structural inequalities of market 326 
power within the Northern Irish sector: 327 
 328 
“[In] England, Scotland you’ve a lot more competition…you’ve a lot more small 329 
factories whereas in Northern Ireland you’re now down to a handful of…big processors 330 
and they very much control the price…quantities…movements and specifications.” 331 
(P15) 332 
 333 
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In addition, from NI farmers’ perspective, the power differential between them and 334 
the processor is further reinforced structurally through processors’ collective power by 335 
their communal membership in Northern Ireland Meat Exporters Association (NIMEA) 336 
which is seen as giving processors more political clout on matters of policy and strategic 337 
business ventures. NIMEA’s political strength is perceived to be significantly greater 338 
than the Ulster Farmers Union, partly due having more resources and closer ties to the 339 
Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (referent power, see French 340 
and Raven, 1959). Farmers believe the processors’ closeness to Department of 341 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs enable processors to instigate policy 342 
changes and award subsidies in their favour. Farmers argued processors also have 343 
greater political sway with Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs 344 
because of their relative size, the tax revenues they generate and the local employment 345 
they offer compared to the Ulster Farmers Union:  346 
 347 
“It's a political cat and mouse game half the time with them [processors]… I 348 
remember the BSE time, the whole big thing was how many jobs were lost, then all 349 
these grant subsidies came after that and the jobs were never really lost…the farmer 350 
unions should have more fight, more push in them. I'm in the union myself, but we don't 351 
have time.  It is a group of farmers together…we’ve no voice.” (P20) 352 
 353 
The structure of farmers within the Ulster Farmers Union and the economic and 354 
political clout of processors are used by farmers to explain the differential power 355 
structure within the Northern Irish beef sector. Respondents’ suggestion of how the 356 
structural advantage of processors is then exploited and power is often used explicitly 357 
and coercively, which is closer to Robicheaux and El-Ansary classic understanding of 358 
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power (the more powerful the actor, the greater the use of coercive power) than Blau’s. 359 
Farmers’ responses often contained conjecture and extrapolation. There was a sense that 360 
farmers were ‘filling in’ missing information or ‘joining the dots’, particularly when 361 
they were unable to articulate the specifics of how processors, for example, use their 362 
lobby power. This points to the idea, outlined in Emerson (1962), Gaski (1984), 363 
Fleming and Spicer (2014) and others, that perceptions of powerlessness may in certain 364 
circumstances be self-reinforcing if they begin to structure action and response amongst 365 
weaker parties. If you believe your buyers to be all powerful and you perceive yourself 366 
to be powerless, this will have an impact on negotiation and bargaining strategy.  367 
Of course, such perceptions do not emerge in a vacuum. There is always a structural 368 
context, and many farmers identified control mechanisms - including a variety of divide 369 
and rule tactics used by processors- to embed weakness among farmers. For example, 370 
financial incentives were often offered on an individual basis to farmers who were able 371 
to provide a consistent supply of meat that met processor specifications. This 372 
individualised bargaining created mistrust, suspicion and fragmentation between 373 
farmers themselves (see Nitschke and O’Keefe, 1997). This one-to-one negotiation 374 
tactic meant farmers received quite different deals from the processors, which forced 375 
farmers to compete amongst themselves, discouraging collective negotiation and the 376 
formation of farmer co-ops.  377 
 378 
“…the meat plants always approach you outside the group…” (P20) 379 
 380 
In addition, farmers did not feel they were in a position to negotiate with different 381 
processors if they were unhappy with the deal they received as collusion between 382 
processors prevented any form of countervailing power from farmers: 383 
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 384 
“If Farmer X walked into Processor Y and said 'What will you give me, and I'll do a 385 
contract with you?' He has to get out of the contract he has with Processor Z and then 386 
Processor Z is going to lift the phone to Processor Y and he is going to say ‘…you're 387 
after taking a man of mine…it'll cost you.'…Processor Z owns the processing for any 388 
further processing that it [offal] needs…it has to go to his place…if you don't tow the 389 
ball he could say 'I'm not talking your offal’.” (P16) 390 
 391 
According to our respondents, structural practices and tactics allow processors to 392 
dictate prices through information asymmetries in the supply chain. Processors have 393 
access to cattle information via the Animal and Public Health Information System 394 
(APHIS) and through the practice of farmers registering cattle with processors at birth 395 
or purchase. This information allow processors to make projections of supply and 396 
demand and thus negotiate lower prices for cattle. Farmers see processors importing 397 
cheaper stock as a mechanism to control local prices. Additionally, processors use the 398 
threat of substitution in their negotiations with Northern Irish farmers to bargain price 399 
reductions. Farmers say they are unable to know if the threat is genuine or a bluff given 400 
their inability to access relevant information: 401 
 402 
“…I feel I have a blindfold on, because they [the processors] have access to APHIS 403 
and...can age profile the cattle in Northern Ireland…They [know] when there’s going to 404 
be a shortage in six months’ time so they can… avoid paying a high price for that six 405 
month shortage. I don’t know when the shortage is going to come up…” (P05). 406 
 407 
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“…everybody knows whenever beef gets to… a certain price here, they’re [the 408 
processors] off to Poland or wherever to buy container loads of beef because they know 409 
that will keep us [farmers] suppressed at a level.” (P19) 410 
  411 
Although these moves may not be part of a deliberate and orchestrated attack to 412 
‘keep farmers supressed’ and more likely to be a reflection of the processors own 413 
competitive pressures, as was the conclusion of previous studies of Dutch pig meat 414 
farmers who expressed similar sentiments (Lindgreen et al., 2005). Nevertheless, these 415 
perceptions reflect a certain amount of suspicion and an exaggerated tendency to regard 416 
the behaviour of others as if it were related to or targeted toward oneself (Fenigstein and 417 
Vanable, 2006).  These feelings of suspicion do however arise within a context of 418 
asymmetric power relations, and the particular form through which power is exercised. 419 
This all has an influence on how farmers experience, internalise and rationalise their 420 
influence and manoeuvrability within the sector: 421 
 422 
“…the processors are operating inside [outside] the gates now. I think they will be 423 
operating inside the farm gates as well, they will just have people working for them… 424 
They will own the cattle…They are taking control; it is all about control.” (P11) 425 
 426 
Farmers make sense of the power relations they experience, which impacts on their 427 
ability to collaborate, resist and exercise power reactively if those perceptions 428 
discourage organisation and action. In this sense Gaski (1984) is right when he argues 429 
that power is a ‘…function of the perceptions of power bases on the part of the one 430 
subjected to the power or influence’ and suggests it maybe more correct to regard the 431 
perception of power itself as the source of power. Similarly the power held by 432 
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processors may derive from farmers’ perceptions of constraints on their own agency or 433 
dependence upon an individual processor or group of processors (Emerson, 1962). We 434 
will now develop this idea in more detail. 435 
 436 
The Impact of Power on Agency and Trust 437 
As previously discussed, the dominant view is that in the academic literature around 438 
supply chain management is that (coercive) power and trust are inversely related - as 439 
coercive power is exercised, trust in the supply chain decreases (Doukidis et al., 2007). 440 
Our respondents highlighted mistrust across three different relations: between farmers 441 
and processors, between farmers and government (Department of Agriculture, 442 
Environment and Rural Affairs) and between farmers themselves.  443 
Many farmers expressed mistrust towards processors and similar results were 444 
observed at a national level with a study by Fischer et al. (2007). Their study found high 445 
levels of mistrust for processors among UK beef farmers, which increased as coercive 446 
control was exerted by processors. This adversarial relation took on an almost 447 
apocalyptic tone in some cases as one farmer made clear:  448 
 449 
“Farmers do not trust them factories [processors]…I've heard them call them things 450 
I couldn't repeat. It’s unreal what people think of them…there has to be a bit more 451 
honesty…and if it doesn’t come I don’t know…what’s going to happen…[I] just can't 452 
handle them. They can do things that nobody else could do.” (P19) 453 
 454 
Many farmers recognise the importance of farmer cooperatives to increase their 455 
supply chain power and position, (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 456 
Development, 2006; Fleming and Spicer, 2014 for discussion of benefits). Nitschke and 457 
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O’Keefe (1997) state the formation of such producer co-operatives require a great deal 458 
of trust to develop practice that avoids opportunism and reinforces mutual goals. 459 
However, results of this study suggest the processors use of (explicit or diffuse) power 460 
had an effect on farmers’ own sense of trust, collegiality and togetherness with each 461 
other. This lack of trust and collegiality among farmers may be rooted in the suspicion 462 
that their counterparts have been financially encouraged to function outside of the co-463 
operative format by processors, as discussed previously: 464 
 465 
“The small mindedness of Northern Ireland farmers. Rather than helping somebody, 466 
they would cut their throat; that's the problem…If you did a deal with the dairy farmer 467 
they would be think ‘oh my, they're worth more in XXX today!' And they just wouldn't 468 
stand over it, that's the problem.” (P13). 469 
 470 
Farmers also noted the presence of strongly individualist sentiments amongst other 471 
farmers which worked against the formation of co-operatives which might be able to 472 
wrestle back some control within the supply chain. Respondents mentioned the failure 473 
of co-operatives in the past due to farmer intransigence and an inability to organise 474 
collectively: 475 
 476 
“…Farmers are particularly bad at working together…we are very much 477 
individuals… we don’t work together well for our own benefit.” (P22) 478 
 479 
Farmers also expressed a mistrust of the government department, Department of 480 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs and their willingness to act in the farmer 481 
interests, related to the perception of processors’ ‘syndicate power’ to lobby Department 482 
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of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs as a greater force relative to the power of 483 
the Ulster Farmers Union who lobby on behalf of farmers. Farmers believe the mistrust 484 
presents itself in both directions in that they also believe Department of Agriculture, 485 
Environment and Rural Affairs do not trust them as farmers. Farmers see over-486 
regulation and the gold plating of regulations imposed on the farming community as 487 
evidence of that mistrust, albeit characterised by further suspicions about other farmers: 488 
 489 
“…they [government] don’t trust us one bit…I don't know, maybe there is some 490 
farmers that need watching, but there’s also some department officials that need 491 
watching as well…some of the schemes that they brought out to try and help farmers, 492 
like Jesus, the hoops you've to jump through.” (P19) 493 
 494 
Much of this mistrust is derived from the farmer’s sense of powerlessness against 495 
and dependence on the ‘powerful’ processors. 496 
Despite widespread recognition that collaborative agri-food relationships between 497 
supply chain actors should be encouraged (Lindgreen and Hingley, 2003; Barratt, 2004; 498 
Boel, 2006; Fischer et al., 2008; Lindgreen et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2010; Humphries 499 
and McCombie, 2010; Agri-Food Strategy Board (AFSB), 2013), results indicate 500 
farmers believe poor collaboration exists between farmers and processors and among 501 
farmers. These practices are viewed by farmers as personal ‘attacks’, rather than 502 
‘normal’ business operations in the competitive market place. These ‘normative’ or 503 
referent sources of power are more opaque and not immediately explicit, as Fleming and 504 
Spicer (2014) suggest. This referent power is more subtle and relates to farmers’ 505 
perceptions of ‘the rules of the game’, their own agency with regard to what is and what 506 
is not possible, and what they can and can’t do within their section of the chain. These 507 
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diffuse power structures have prevented farmers from organising themselves in a way 508 
(e.g. farmer co-ops) to countervail power exerted by processors. This being said, even if 509 
farmers could organise themselves in a way to countervail processor power, their efforts 510 
may be fruitless due to the processors apparent ability to utilise imports as and when 511 
required. What then emerges is form of pragmatic but resigned engagement drawn from 512 
their perceptions of what they believe they have to do in order to be accommodating, 513 
further disempowering the farmer. This also shapes the power relations in the sector and 514 
dictates relationship norms. Indeed it may be the case that power is simply ‘built into’ 515 
these supply chain relationships (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972) ensuring that some form of 516 
accommodation must be made to be ‘part of the game’. These kind of themes – 517 
pragmatism, resignation, accommodation – recurred in a number of respondent 518 
interviews: 519 
 520 
“I work with them [processors] very well and the rogues, they’re not really rogues, 521 
because you have to work with them. You can’t win every battle, that’s what farmers 522 
[do,] try to win every single battle and you can’t because there’s other times you have a 523 
battle going on and you have to let it go.” (P13) 524 
 525 
“I’d call… [the farmer-processor relationship] ‘midlin’. It means so-so, not 526 
great…[and that’s] based on less trust and transparency” (P15) 527 
 528 
It is evident the diffused power possessed by processors has consequences on both 529 
trust as well as agency. Perceived power effects trust among farmers, with processors 530 
and with government (Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs). 531 
Mistrust prevents these actors working cohesively together for the greater good. 532 
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Farmers feel a sense of helplessness and a need to accommodate and resign to the 533 
powerful processor requirements in order to survive in the marketplace. Understanding 534 
the processors perceptions on explicit and diffused sources of power may provide useful 535 
insights to how relationships in the NI beef supply chain could become more 536 
collaborative. 537 
Power structures exist both explicitly and diffusely within supply chain relationships 538 
but these results suggests it is power diffused in the normal environment that has a 539 
significant effect on supply chain functioning in the NI beef industry, particularly 540 
regarding the sense of suspicion that is created among farmers which prevent 541 
collaboration. Thus to address the situation , power in the supply chain needs to be 542 
acknowledged (Chicksand, 2015) and even accepted, in return for other benefits such as 543 
long term commitment, (Hingley, 2005; Chicksand, 2015), provided these assurances 544 
can be made. Approximately 80% of NI beef (and sheepmeat) produced serves the UK 545 
(inc. NI) market (Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs, 2016), 546 
with the food retail market contributing a significant share to this due to their plight for 547 
UK/British origin beef. Therefore, these assurances already exist to an extent. 548 
Additionally, the impact of diffuse systems of power in supply relationships needs to be 549 
studied so that the effects and consequences of diffused power can be better understood 550 
and ways of positive cooperative behaviour investigated. 551 
One way to enhance collaboration in the beef industry lies with trust enhancement 552 
provisions and levering opportunities that may arise from more trusting exchanges 553 
between farmers and processors. Cuevas et al. (2015) suggest that trust can be built in 554 
asymmetric power relationships via goal congruence, leading to positive outcomes. 555 
Again these authors highlight the need for non-coercive power to maintain trust. In 556 
addition delivering reliability, keeping arrangements, understanding and education of 557 
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requirements, exchanging of valuable information and fair pricing are other ways trust 558 
can be built into the supply chain interactions (Lindgreen, 2003, Suvanto, 2012). In 559 
order to build an effective trusting relationship with the processor farmers must be 560 
willing to surrender some of their independence (O’Keeffe, 1998). It is apparent that 561 
trust building is going to have to be a joint effort between farmers and processors with 562 
both willing to make changes to their current business exchanges in order to overturn 563 
supply chain dysfunctions. 564 
 565 
Conclusion 566 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use a constructivist approach to 567 
explore how diffused, embedded power in supply chain structures manifest perceptions 568 
of powerlessness and mistrust from the ‘ground up’ in the weakest supply chain actor- 569 
farmers. Farmers consider themselves to be powerless against powerful processors who 570 
have access to supply and demand information and have substantial political clout 571 
relative to them. Farmers describe a series of divide and rule tactics employed by 572 
processors including, offering financial incentives to individual farmers in return for 573 
consistent cattle supply. These practices reinforce the processors structural power and 574 
consequentially discourages the formation of farmer co-ops further embedding 575 
weakness among farmers. The practices are viewed as orchestrated acts by processors to 576 
control and supress farmers, rather than ‘normative’ operations or as a result 577 
competitive pressures experienced by processors. How farmers understand the power 578 
relations experienced, debilitates their ability to collaborate and resist processor power 579 
or exercise countervailing power. A process of accommodation ensues whereby farmers 580 
resign themselves to play by ‘the rules of the game’ in order to remain ‘part of the 581 
game’.  582 
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As there is limited literature in the area of power exchanges in the farmer-processor 583 
dyad, literature relating to more downstream relationships (processors-retailer) was used 584 
which needs to be considered. Secondly, we only report the farmer perspective of the 585 
relationship and therefore the processors view of the relationship also needs to be 586 
addressed. This study provides a snapshot of beef farmer views on processors in a small 587 
country context where farming is characterised by small, fragmented operations coupled 588 
with a small numbers of processors. This context need to be considered when results are 589 
extrapolated to different scenarios or other operations in the food industry. Despite this, 590 
the study provides evidence of a relationship dyad in the beef industry that needed 591 
investigation and provides compelling evidence of the strained relationships burdened 592 
with issues of perceived power and trust dynamics in the beef sector. 593 
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